

Double Dippers Started It

A root-cause of the fish-mortality problem can be traced back to the creation of the Rehired Annuitant job classification to claw-back skills deemed necessary after an individual left government service.

A **Rehired Annuitant** is a job classification for when a government employee retires, taking with them essential skills without briefing or training their replacement in order to pass along *known* critical skills when the remaining workforce closes-ranks to take up the slack.

In instances like index testing hydroelectric turbines, these skills are complex and require much time and experience for one to become proficient. These mission-critical skills *must be retained* so occasionally retirees are brought-back-in as a *Rehired Annuitants* so their specific skills remain available. This was setting up a second paycheck for the individual, hence the term: *Double Dipping*. As frequently happens in government, a plan that everyone liked and supported at first develops unintended consequences as it flourishes. There was minimal oversight on this boon so it flourished...

As more and more people took advantage of this boon, retiring as early as possible and getting a Rehired Annuitant gig, the increased labor costs were noticed and investigated. In 1983 the U.S. Congress passed the **Windfall Elimination Provision (WEP)** that Reagan signed to specifically *close the loophole* that allowed this gift in order to specifically ban BPA and HDC's brand of *Double Dipping* - except in rare instances in DOD where mission-critical skills are needed - but only with high-level management approvals.

***(Research for this using the Free A.I. assistant in the Free Edge browser from Microsoft brought information focused only on Social Security benefits. Lee and Rod seemed to indicate the difference was in base-wage and thus more significant to gross income. In any event, it was singled out and characterized as a "Windfall" and the Double Dippers were outraged by Congress and the President's Double Standard, what with their own insider-trading, sexual-harassment-hush-money slush-funds and other outrageous congressional perks. This outraged their sense of entitlement and they were seeking ways to resume their dubious largesse by any means necessary. They didn't have to look for very long.**

By 1985, the President had initiated a buildup of facilities in the middle-east from which to conduct hostilities that everyone knew were coming.

Prudence dictated that preparations get underway before funding could be coaxed out of Congress. To make it happen, military construction agencies (USACE and U.S. Navy Seabees for sure) paid out-of-pocket for necessary expenses by clawing-back funds from every nook-and-cranny – USACE hollowed-out the support budget for FCRPS hydropower maintenance and upgrades which led to unscheduled outages and lengthy downtimes waiting for repairs and parts. When outages started cutting into power delivered by USACE HDC to DOE BPA, they didn't like replacing the cheap government hydropower with more expensive private-sector fossil-fueled power so they decided to shake-loose some infrastructure-investment funds from the revenue-stream from power-sales rather than go through Congress. This low-level fund transfer program to USACE was setup to reinvest funds skimmed from power sales for generation-infrastructure maintenance, repairs and upgrades.

The frustrated Double Dippers saw this as an opportunity to resume their largesse – by setting up their own private companies to offer support services to BPA and HDC as, “Captive Suppliers” to get in-line to receive these funds that would be steered to them by friends on the DOE HOT spending committee who would willingly comply to get a cushy post-retirement job at ACSI upon retirement as their payoff.

Like all other abysmal government deals, the Captive Supplier business model concept was adopted with the best of intentions. It's first boast was that it would be a ready-reserve of recently retired HDC engineers and technicians with proper security clearances ready to respond to emergencies at FCRPS powerplants. Everyone agreed it was a good idea.

Another benefit proffered by the Captive Supplier was that when civil service USACE Hydropower engineers needed a technology or device that was unavailable from the private sector, they could design their own equipment and then outsource it for mass-production and deployment to the Captive Supplier network, thereby making-work for the retiree-ready-reserve and getting valuable work done in a controlled economic environment.

This arrangement was very attractive to military planners because the added benefit of the Captive Supplier's personnel as a ready-reserve made contingency planning much easier.

The first task of the Captive Suppliers was to figure out what and how to make something useful they could sell.

After a few years they figured out that they're not imaginative enough to create new stuff, so they decided to use the power, gravitas, funding and legal protection of their government jobs to wrest technology and Intellectual Property from the private sector and sell it via their Captive Suppliers back into the vast Federal Columbia River Power System (FCRPS).

The first instance of this that I am aware of was SCIPAR's SCADA system design information for the system they installed at Chief Joseph Dam in 1975. This information was not exploited until the bidding started for the [renovation at McNary Dam](#) that was completed in 2000.

In 1980 HDC needed to prime-the-pump to green-light outsourcing work to the Captive supplier network they created.

The rule made-up for this was that in order to get the Captive Suppliers started supplying stuff to HDC was that there must be a requirement that the private sector suppliers cannot or would not provide. A suitable technology would be devised at and by HDC engineers and farmed-out, or sub-contracted to a Captive Supplier who would then mass produce and deploy the new technology all throughout FCRPS, thus starting their economic engine.

An opportunity for this was created by dis-informing USACE upper management as to the unsuitability of the wirewound potentiometer used on Woodward's new [Digital Electronic 3-D Cams](#), 18 of which were installed at Bonneville Dam in 1980 when Powerhouse #2 was commissioned. The Woodward 3-D Cams worked so well that Powerhouse #1 was upgraded with the new Woodward Digital Electronic 3-D Cams.

HDC claimed that the WireWound feedback potentiometer on the 3-D Cam's floating-lever riser-cam was unreliable and unacceptable and must be replaced with a non-contacting rotary transducer. There is a ban on using composition-type

potentiometers as feedback elements on hydroelectric turbines. Wirewound type potentiometers are not included in this ban, but they deceived their superiors by ignoring this distinction.

[A dissertation on potentiometers is at this link.](#)

It seems that government engineers didn't say anything to Woodward about it either.

4 and ½ years later George Mittendorf and Dave Kornegay were still wondering why USACE didn't buy more 3-D Cams. The reason the ITB project was started up was to make the new digital electronic 3-D Cam more appealing to the market. I don't believe they even told Woodward about it, they just told their superiors they had. George and Dave were unaware and surprised when I told them what I had learned in Portland. They would have *bent-over-backwards* to keep their 3-D Cams at Bonneville, but didn't know there was a problem.

End of file.